Pruss' Argument From Forgiveness

To my mind, there are few contemporary philosophers of religion who are more inventive than Alexander Pruss of Baylor University. Though he knows the classical arguments of philosophy of religion well (cosmological, ontological, etc.), he's also constantly creating new arguments for theism. I find his creativity inspiring, and also very instructive for budding undergraduate philosophers (like those frequently found lunching every odd-dated Wednesday in the Providence cafeteria).

Back in September, Pruss posted an interesting argument from forgiveness that I think is worth pondering. It's reprinted below (click here to go to the original post, which includes follow-up comments).

1. (Premise) If one has done a wrong, one ought to ask someone for forgiveness of it.
2. (Premise) If God does not exist, there are some wrongs (e.g., the murder of someone who has no friends or relatives) that one cannot appropriately ask anyone for forgiveness of.
3. (Premise) If one ought to do something, then one can appropriately do it.
4. Therefore, if God does not exist, there are some things one ought to do but cannot appropriately do. (By 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, God exists. (By 3 and 4).

Thoughts?

Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Religion

Robert Gressis, a contributor over at The Prosblogion, a philosophy of religion blog, has posted a couple of very interesting articles about recent developments in the field of philosophy of religion. The first is entitled, "Atheist Burnout and the Direction of Philosophy of Religion." It discusses philosopher Keith Parsons and his recent public decision to quit the philosophy of religion because he no longer finds theism respectable, let alone tenable or presentable. Parsons writes, "I just cannot take their [theistic philosophers'] arguments seriously anymore, and if you cannot take something seriously, you should not try to devote serious academic attention to it." As soon as Parsons said this several others philosophers admitted that they had reached the same conclusion. Gressis' three brief reflections on this situation are, in my opinion, worth reading.

The second article is entitled, "Philosophy of Religion as Seen by Atheists." It follows up on the subsequent comments and discussion generated by Parsons' announcement, and summarizes the two main opinions floating around this issue.

What are your thoughts on these recent developments in the philosophy of religion? Do you think they could they be part of some larger movement within philosophy or Western society (e.g., university politics, academic freedom, the "New Atheism")? If more atheists quit or discredit the philosophy of religion, what ripple effects might it have on the discipline in the future?